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REMOVING THE BAR OF EXCLUSIONARY ZONING
TO A DECENT HOME
The people in the slums are the symptoms of the urban problem, not
the cause. They are virtually imprisoned in slums by the white sub-
urban noose around the inner city, a noose that says "Negroes and
poor people not wanted."'
Recently a group of churches planned to build an integrated middle-
income apartment project in the Black Jack area of suburban St. Louis.
Confronted with the prospect of an integrated housing project, the resi-
dents of Black Jack, which is nearly all white, promptly incorporated them-
selves as a town and, as an incorporated entity, passed a zoning ordinance
which excluded all multiple family dwellings.2
In January, 1969, the Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organiza-
tion (SASSO) obtained an option to purchase property in Union City,
California for the purpose of constructing thereon a 280 unit, federally
funded, low-and moderate-income housing project.3 Although the land
purchased was zoned as agricultural-single family residential, SASSO suc-
cessfully obtained a variance permitting multiple family residential use on
the subject land from the City Council. However, the ordinance permit-
ting the variance never went into effect because community opponents of
the proposed housing project commenced a referendum proceeding which
eventually resulted in the rejection of the ordinance by the voters.
In May, 1967, Columbia Square, Inc., a de facto corporation operating
under the auspices of the Catholic Church, sought rezoning of a parcel of
land in Lawton, Oklahoma, so that multiple family dwellings for low-
and moderate-income families could be erected thereon.4  The subject land
for which rezoning was sought was located in the midst of a much larger
tract of land which was zoned predominately for high density apartment
I NATIONAL COMIUsSSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AmERICAN CITY 1
(1968) [hereinafter cited as DOUGLAS COMNSSSION).
2 The Wall Street Journal, Jan. 15, 1971, at 6, cols. 1, 2.
3 Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization (SASSO) v. City of Union City, 314 F.
Supp. 967 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970). Quite similar to the fact situ-
ation presented in SASSO is the fact pattern of Ranjel v. City of Lansing, 293 F. Supp. 301
(W.D. Mich. 1969), rev'd 417 F.2d 321 (6th Cir. 1969). In Raniel the City of Lansing together
with HUD selected a site in a predominately white, single family residential neighborhood on
which it was proposed to build multiple family units for low-income families. Since subject
land was zoned for single family residences, it was necessary to seek rezoning for multiple family
dwellings. As in SASSO the local governmental unit approved the rezoning, and then the local
citizenry sought to repeal the ordinance authorizing the rezoning via a referendum. At this time,
although only slightly more than 10% of the Lansing residents were Black or Mexican Ameri-
can, approximately 6595 of these two groups were concentrated in a ghetto containing only
11% of Lansing's total population. 293 F. Supp. at 303.
4 Dailey v. City of Lawton, 296 F. Supp. 266 (W.D. Okla. 1969), aff'd 425 F.2d 1037 (10th
Cir. 1970).
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use. Notwithstanding the existence of compatible adjoining uses,r the
proposed rezoning was rejected by both the Lawton Metropolitan Area
Planning Commission and the Lawton City Council. It is significant that
of the numerous people who signed petitions opposing the rezoning and
who attended the public meetings at which the proposed rezoning was
considered,6 there were no Negroes or persons of other minority groups.
The above cases epitomize the impact of exclusionary zoning, and serve
as an introduction to this note, the thrust of which will be threefold. First,
it will examine the problem of exclusionary zoning viewed in the light of
our national housing shortage and the actual existence of zoning regula-
tions which bar low-cost housing from the amenities of the suburbs. Em-
phasis will be placed upon the reasons why communities enact exclusion-
ary zoning regulations and the effect of these regulations on the cost per
housing unit. Second, the traditional judicial approach to the resolution
of zoning disputes will be considered together with the results of decided
cases. Third, a new judicial approach to the resolution of zoning disputes
will be explored-an approach apparently taken, at least in part, by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Appeal of Kit-Afar Builders, Inc.'
I. THE PROBLEM
A. The Need for Housing
The need for more decent housing in American cities is so great, so
pressing, and so obvious that much larger and more vigorous efforts
to meet it are urgently needed.9
Indeed, the need for more adequate housing is both pressing and ob-
vious. This fact has been well documented by both the Douglas Commis-
sion" and the Kaiser Commission.11 In a report to the Kaiser Commis-
sion, TEMPO, General Electric's Center for Advanced Studies found that
5 The trial court in Dailey found:
[No other person in the entire area, owning property therein, has his property zoned,
with minor exceptions, except as R-4 zoning, a zoning classification which plaintiff
seeks .... 296 F. Supp. at 268.
6 Over 250 or more people opposing the proposed rezoning attended the meetings of the
Lawton Area Metropolitan Planning Commission and the Lawton City Council. Id. at 268.
7 Exclusionary zoning:
[Z]oning that raises the price of residential access to a particular area, and thereby
denies that access to members of low-income groups. Sager, Tight Little Islands: Ex-
clusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Sager].
Exclusionary zoning can take many forms. It includes large-lot zoning, minimum floor-area
requirements, exclusion or strict limitation of multifamily dwellings and exclusion or strict limi-
tation of mobile homes.
8 Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466,268 A.2d 765 (1970).
9 DOUGLAS COMMISSION at 69.
10 DOUGLAS COMMISSION.
31 PRESIDENTS COMMITTEE ON URBAN HOUSING, A DECENT HOME (1968) [hereinafter
cited as KAISER COMMISSION].
[Vol. 32.
NOTES
some nine million people occupied substandard housing units in the United
States in 1960.12 In another report to the Commission, where a different
test was employed for determining what constituted substandard housing,'3
it was found that there were some 15 million substandard housing units
in 1960.14 This number was equal to a full one-quarter of the total hous-
ing inventory in the United States at the time."5
While the physical condition of the housing inventory is one indicator
of its adequacy, it is not the sole factor to be considered. Another factor
of considerable significance is the crowding of existing housing. While
the Kaiser Commission did not expressly state the number of households
living in crowded conditions in substandard housing units, it did indicate
that about four million households in 1960 were living in crowded condi-
tions in standard housing units. Furthermore, the Commission revealed
the rather alarming figures that "three out of ten nonwhite households
were crowded in 1960, and one out of ten white households."'6
As could be expected, the nation's poor people are the hardest hit by
the inadequate supply of standard, non-crowded housing.
A seven-city ... staff study [for the Douglas Commission] showed that
there were 103,000 large poor families in the seven cities who could not
afford to rent standard housing of a suitable size at market rents. In these
seven cities only 20,000 units with three or more bedrooms in publically
assisted housing of any kind was available to these families. The gap be-
tween the need and the units available was, therefore, 83,000 units, or
over 80 percent.'1
Both the Douglas Commission' 8 and Kaiser Commission, 9 to cope with
12 KAISER COMISSiON at 43.
13 TEMPO only called "substandard" those units which the Census takers had found to be
dilapidated or lacking adequate plumbing faculities. The other report also added deteriorated
units in arriving at its total of substandard units. Id. It is felt that the latter method produces
the more realistic figure with which to work when determining future housing needs, since the
time gap between deteriorated and dilapidated housing would probably be shorter than the
time gap between the planning and occupancy stages of housing--especially public housing.
'4 Id.
15Id. The Douglas Commission reported that there were at least 11 million substandard
and overcrowded dwelling units in the United States in 1968; a figure which represented 16
percent of the total housing inventory at that time. DOUGLAS COMMUssIoN at 9. The differ-
ence between the figures arrived at by the two commissions may stem from the definition used
in determining what constitutes substandard housing as well as the great difficulty in obtaining
adequate housing data.
10 KAiSER COAMfSSIoN at 44. As could be expected, the bulk of the crowded households,
58 percent, were located in metropolitan areas. Id.
17 DOUGLAS COMMISSION at 10.
18 The Douglas Commission recommended that the nation should build 2 to 2V million new
housing units a year. Id. at 11.
19 In a report to the Kaiser Commission, TEMPO found that the Nation:
[M]ust build and rehabilitate 26 million houses and apartments in the next decade to
provide for all the new households forming, to allow enough vacancies for our increas-
ingly mobile population, to replace houses destroyed or demolished, and to eliminate
all substandard housing. KAISER COMIUSSION at 39-40.
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this "pressing and obvious" need for adequate housing, charted an am-
bitious home building course for the nation establishing a goal of between
2.0 to 2.6 million new housing units per year.20 This figure is to be com-
pared with the then current annual rate of housing units built of 1.5
million units per year.21 Moreover, according to the recommendation of
the Douglas Commission, a significant portion of this new housing should
be specifically reserved for people in the lower income brackets.22
With more jobs shifting to locations outside the central city,a2 it is
apparent that the logical location for the bulk of any new housing is in
the suburbs. Low- and moderate-income families would benefit from liv-
ing closer to jobs,24 to shopping and recreational facilities, and living in
lower density housing not adjacent to unattractive non-residential uses, as
20 It is significant to note that:
An important byproduct of building more dwelling units will be increased jobs-
about 165,000 a year to construct the homes and about 330,000 a year in related sup-
plier industries. These combined new workers could make a big dent in urban un-
employment, especially among the young and minority groups. DOUGLAS COMMIS-
SION at 11.
Additionally, now that the Nation's priorities are apparently being restructured so that defense
is relegated to a lesser priority than it possessed in the sixties, the housing industry could utilize
a part of those technically trained men and women who had formerly been funneled into the
defense industry. That same technical ingenuity that created the Polaris missle system and F-4
Phantom aircraft could then be directed at providing adequate, low-cost housing for everyone.
2 1 KAISER COMIUSSION at 40. The Douglas Commission reported that the rate of homes
built over the six years prior to the Commission's report was 1A5 million per year, not counting
mobile homes, and that in only one year since World War II, 1950, had the Nation even ap-
proached the annual rate of 2 million new units built per year. DOUGLAS CoMMWSSION at 11.
22 The Douglas Commission recommended that 500,000 units of new housing be specifically
reserved for people in the lower income brackets. Of this figure, it was further recommended
that:
[A] fair breakdown would be to designate 100,000 a year for the abject poor (incomes
up to $2,200 a year for families of four); 100,000 for the poor (incomes up to $3,300);
100,000 for the near poor (incomes up to $4,500); and 200,000 units for families with
incomes over $4,500 but who still cannot afford to buy or rent decent housing in the
private market. DOUGLAS COMMISSION at 11.
For comparison and to illustrate a still unsolved problem, it is significant to note that Congress,
in the Housing Act of 1949, recommended that 135,000 new public housing units be built a
year for each of the following 6 years. This would have created 810,000 new public housing
units in a 6 year period. At the time the Douglas Commission made its report (1968), only
500,000 units of public housing had been built since 1949. Thus, what had been a noble 6
year goal had not seen fulfillment after a period of nearly 20 years. Id. at 14.
23 [T]here has been a massive movement of employment activities to the suburbs and
outlying areas. Between 1960 and 1967, for example, 62 per cent of all industrial
buildings and 52 per cent of all commercial buildings were constructed outside the
central cities of metropolitan areas.... Consequently, central city residents are find-
ing that new job opportunities are farther and farther away from them than ever.
Brooks, Exclusionary Zoning, PLANNING ADViSORY SERVICE3 RBPORT No. 254 2
(Feb. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Brooks). (footnotes omitted).
See DOUGLAS COMMISSION at 47.
24 By locating homes near where jobs are to be found, the employed man or woman would
save a considerable portion of the cost of commuting as well as the time involved. Furthermore,
since many transit systems do not provide an adequate link between the suburban job site and
the central city and since many employable central ciry dwellers cannot afford cars, the location
of new housing units for the present central city dwellers in the suburbs would open up new op.
portunities for employment. See DOUGLAS COMMISSION at 48.
often is the case. 3 It would follow that placement of public housing units
in suburbia, instead of in the disparaging conditions of the central city
would better promote the concept of the general welfare, which is closely
associated with most zoning decisions.2(6
B. The Existence of Exclusionary Zoning Regulations
If there are no zoning changes, the vacant land in the New York re-
gion ... may not be sufficient to hold the projected growth of that
region's population to 1985.n
While it is evident that the bulk of this nation's new housing should
be placed in the suburbs, it is equally evident that local governments which
control the suburbs' growth do not want all of this new housing. As a
result, there exists a wide variety of exclusionary zoning regulations."'
The most prominent regulation is probably the requirement for a minimum
lot size.29 For example, "25 percent of metropolitan area municipalities
of 5,000-plus permit no single-family houses on lots of less than one-half
acre"; ° "48 percent of the vacant land zoned for residential use in the
New York City region, excluding the city itself, required lots of one acre
or more";31 "[i]n Connecticut, more than half of the vacant land zoned
for residential use in the entire State is for lots of 1 to 2 acres"; 32 "67
percent of the vacant land zoned for single-family development in the
core county of the Cleveland SMSA [Standard Metropolitan Statistical
Area] is zoned for minimum lots of one-half acre of [sic] more";33 and a
1964 study of the State of New Jersey indicated "that over 75 percent
of the total zoned land in the state was zoned for single family residences
on lots greater than one-half acre in size . . . ."' Moreover, it is alarming
to note that many zoning requirements for minimum lot size are the result
of recent changes in local zoning regulations. 5
25 See Sager at 781.
26 See Williams and Wacks, Segregation of Residential Areas Along Economic Lines: Lions-
head Lake Revisited, 1969 WIsc. L. REV. 827, 839 [hereinafter cited as Williams and Wacks].
2 7 KAisER COMmiSSION at 140.
2 8 
ee DOUGLAS COMMISSION at 211-16.
2 9 See Becker, The Police Power and Minimum Lot Size Zoning Part I: A Method of Analy-
sis, 1969 WASH. L. Q. 263,265 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Becker].
30 DOUGLAS COMmilSSION at 214. The Douglas Commission further reported that "Of these
same governments, 11 percent have some two-acre zoning; 20 percent have some one-to-two-
acre zoning, 33 percent have some one-half-to-one-acre zoning; and more than 50 percent have
some one-fourth-to-one-half-acre zoning." Id.
3 1 KAISER COMMussION at 140.
3 2 DouGLAS CONMMSSION at 215. The Douglas Commission also noted that "In Green-
wich, Conn., a community of about 65,000 within mass-transit commuting distance of New
York City, more than four-fifths of the total undeveloped area is zoned for minimum lots of 1
acre or more-39 percent for 4 acres, 25 percent for 2 acres, and 17V percent for 1 acre." Id.
331d,
34 Note, Snob Zoning: Developments in Massachusetts and New Jersey, 7 HARV. J. LEGIS.
246,249 n.17 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Snob Zoning: Developments].
33 bThe Douglas Commission reported:
1971] NOTES
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Another technique of exclusionary zoning is the total prohibition or
severe restriction of land zoned for apartments. While most local govern-
ments do not go to the extreme that the town of Black Jack, MAissiouri 0 did
in totally excluding multiple family dwellings, many local governments
severely restrict the amount of land available for apartments3 7 so that, as
a result, the supply of apartments does not meet the demand; or they permit
apartments only if a special exception is granted.3
The same techniques which are used to exclude apartments are also
used to exclude mobile homes. 9 Additionally, many local zoning codes
prescribe that single housing units have a minimum floor area which is
conveniently set above the amount of living space contained in most mobile
homes.40  The net effect of this restriction is that mobile homes are as ef-
fectively barred from the excluding community as if the zoning code were
written to expressly prohibit them.
The impact of minimum floor area requirements is, of course, not limited
merely to mobile homes; it also extends to the typical single-family residence.
In fact, one town has used this technique to impose a 1,700 square-foot mini-
mum floor area requirement.4'
Although the imprimatur of exclusionary zoning is dearly evident in
many local zoning codes throughout the United States, there does not seem
to be any single reason 42 why a community will adopt an exclusionary zoning
For five of the counties in the metropolitan areas [surrounding New York), the aver-
age lot size increased from 9,000 square feet in 1950 to 19,000 square feet in 1957.
... Since 1960, major protions of Monmouth, Suffolk, and Orange Counties have been
rezoned from one-fourth acre and one-eighth acre lots to one-half and 1-acre lots.
DOUGLAS COMMISSION at 214-15.
3 6 See the text accompanying note 2 supra.
3 7 DOUGLAS COMMISSION at 215. For example, "[olf the undeveloped land zoned for
residential purposes in the New York metropolitan area... 99.2 percent is restricted to single-
family dwellings." Id.
38 By using a special exception which does not permit apartments outright, the local govern-
ment can force the developer to negotiate. Then the local government can attempt to bid up
the price or cost of the apartment structure or limit the apartment development to one bedroom
units or efficiencies, so that poor people and large families are excluded. See id. at 216.
39 The Douglas Commission reported:
A study in 1964 showed that in New York State, of 237 zoning ordinances reviewed,
over half excluded mobile homes either explicitly or by imposing minimums relating
to floor area, height or other factors which mobile homes could not meet. Only 82
communities permitted mobile homes on individual lots, as distinguished from mo-
bile home parks; and in all but 12 of these communities such lots had to be in areas
zoned for industrial or commercial uses. Only 11 communities permitted mobile
home parks to locate in residentially zoned areas. Id.
Locally, the City of Columbus prohibited "Trailer camps and courts;' COLUMBUS ZONING
CODE § 3387.01 (1967), until the Zoning Code was amended to permit a Mobile Home Park
District, COLUMBUS ZONING CODE § 3385.28, on January 18,1971.
4 0 See note 37 supra.
41 The town of Bloomington, Minnesota, an affluent suburb of the Twin Cities, required the
1,700-square-foot minimum floor area at a time when the construction cost of building the small-
est home permitted was $26,894.00. DOUGLAS COMMISSION at 215.
4 2 See DOUGLAS COMMISSION at 214.
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regulation. Instead, there seems to be a mixing of fiscal43 and non-fiscal44
factors which do not apply with equal force to any given community. 5 As a
result, if the popular stereotype of the Deep South is true, a community in
Southern Mississippi might adopt an ordinance requiring a minimum lot
size of two acres in order to exclude black men and women, while a coin-
munity in New Jersey might adopt the same minimum lot size requirement
43 The fiscal objective behind many exclusionary zoning ordinances stems primarily from
the antiquated system of property taxation used by many local communities as their chief rev-
enue source. Although not approving "fiscal zoning" two writers sum the syllogism supporting
it quite well:
Under the quainte olde American system of financing schools and other major public
services primarily from local real estate taxes, growing communities may obtain major
financial advantages by encouraging those land uses (non residential development, ex-
pensive housing, and perhaps efficiency apartments) which bring in substantial local
tax revenues and require relatively less in public services, and conversely by discour-
aging those land uses (particularly inexpensive housing) which bring less in local tax
revenues and require larger expenditures for public services. Williams and Wacks at
829. (footnotes omitted).
Accordingly:
Mhe Parkway School District [in St. Louis County, Missouri] has calculated that any
home costing less than $26,274 does not pay its own way in educational costs. On
this basis, district officials oppose any change in zoning to permit lots of less than a
quarter-acre, below which they believe housing costing less than this amount can be
built. DOUGLAS COMMISSION at 214.
However, the validity of this reasoning has been subjected to critical analysis by one writer:
Proponents of such restrictions have stressed that they increase tax revenues while re-
ducing costs of government services. This argument holds only in rural areas where
few community services are now provided. If such services are provided, larger lot
size may increase the costs to the homeowner or renter because employment, commu-
nity services and schools are farther away and the owner must bear the effect of these in-
creased transportation costs. The trade-off is between the increased cost for street and
water improvements at densities of 3,000 persons or less per square mile and the neces-
sity of providing sewers and schools at higher densities. However, for municipalities
with a population of from 25,000 to 100,000 and a basic capital plant for water, sewer
and school services, reduction of large lot size and concomitant restrictions is not
likely to change the cost of services to the extent that any increase will not be offset by
new tax revenue. Such new revenue would arise from an increased assessment of the
property due both to its division into a smaller number of units and to the often ignored
interrelationship between residential density and revenue from commercial and indus-
trial centers. In addition, the municipality gains added revenue from an increase in
intergovernmental transfer payments for education, health and welfare. Snob Zoning:
Developments at 250-51. (footnotes omitted).
For "fiscal zoning" see generally DOUGLAS COMMISSION at 19; Aloi, Goldburg, and White,
Racial and Economic Segregation by Zoning: Death Knell for Home Rule? 1969 U. TOL. L.
REv. 65, 79; Becker at 283-85.
4 4 The non-fiscal factors behind exclusionary zoning regulations are not capable of easy iden-
tification. In some instances, they might be desires to preserve the rural character of a commu-
nity or its open space. In other cases, they might be racial and snobbish attitudes, which unite
in a desire to keep out "incompatible" people, lower-income groups and minorities. DOUGLAS
COMM ISSION at 214. One commentator aptly described the sum of all of these factors as "life
style":
What is at stake is a community's life style .... That which it regards as burdensome
or offensive, whether it be the intrusion of blue collar workers, Negroes, homes cost-
ing under $20,000 or designed by Frank Lloyd Wright, becomes a real threat to its
way of life .... Beckerat296. (emphasis added).
4 5 For a discussion of the factors behind the exclusion of apartments and mobile homes see
DOUGLAS COMMISSION at 215-16.
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to exclude high density development which would place a greater fiscal
burden on the community's already limited resources.
Whatever a community's reasons for adopting an exclusionary zoning
ordinance, the result of that ordinance will be significant-a discriminatory
chain reaction. The initial event in this chain reaction is the increase in
cost per housing unit. For example, where a large minimum lot size is re-
quired, several results, each of which will increase the cost per housing unit,
are possible and may occur either singularly or in combination. First, by in-
creasing the minimum lot size, the number of housing sites will be decreased.
In the face of a strong demand, "this restriction of the supply of housing
sites will increase residential land costs generally."4" By the same token,
restrictions on land zoned for apartments, which result in demand exceed-
ing supply, increase the cost of appropriately zoned land and, in turn, each
apartment unit. Second, when "a zoning ordinance requires lot sizes larger
than consumers demand, the market for land is distorted and lot costs per
unit are shifted unnecessarily upward."47  Third, "the increase in the total
house-and-lot price may be [even) greater than the increase in land price
caused by large-lot zoning," '48 since "some builders will simply not build
the same house on a large lot that they will on a smaller lot .... ."" Fourth,
"large-lot zoning generally results in added costs for land improvements" 0
-streets, sidewalks, gutters, sewers and water lines.
With the increased cost per housing unit established, the next event in
the discriminatory chain reaction is the exclusion of low-income groups"1
from the amenities of the excluding communities. This is so simply because
these groups cannot afford the increased cost per housing unit, whether it
is in the form of an increase in the price of a new home or an increase in
monthly rent of an apartment. This in turn "automatically brings about
46 DOUGLAS COMMISSION at 214; see Brooks at 8.
47 KAIsER COMMISSION at 142. For example, given the same ratio of supply to demand a
V4 acre lot might cost $2500 and a 1 acre lot might cost $8,000; however, if the number of 1
acre lots is increased at the expense of V acre lots, the price of the V acre lots will increase (for
example, to $3,500) while the price of 1 acre lots will decrease (for example, to $7,000).
4 8 DOUGLAS COMMISSION at 214.
49 Id.
5o Id. It should be noted, however, that the Kaiser Commission found that
[Blecause larger lots do not require the same proportion of site improvement, in-
creases in lot sizes, especially at the higher levels, actually cause surprisingly little in-
crease in total lot costs. KAISER COMI SSION at 142.
While this may be true, if it is also true that builders "observe a rule of thumb that the price
of a lot should be some specified percentage of the total price of house and lot, e.g., 20 percent,"
DOUGLAS ComMIssioN at 214, then an increase in the price of a lot from $3,500.00 to $5,000.00
to accommodate an increase in the minimum lot size from Y4 acre to 1 acre would result in an
increase in the price of the house and lot combination from $21,000.00 to $30,000.00. As can
be seen, the increase in lot price is magnified, so that what might be an affordable $1,500.00
becomes an unaffordable $9,000.00.
51 See DOUGLAS COMMISSION at 7-8; Aloi, Goldberg, and White at 77; Becker at 303; Sager
at 781; Williams and Wacks at 838; Note, Zoning: Closing the Economic Gap, 43 TEMP. L Q.
347, 353 (1970).
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a large degree of racial segregation as well." 52 Thus, a large class of po-
tential residents 1) who desire to escape the central cities, 2) who could af-
ford to pay subsidized rent in publically supported housing projects or could
afford to purchase new homes under the FHA-235 program, 3 and 3) many
of whom are from minority groups, are "virtually imprisoned in the
slums by the white suburban noose around the inner city . . that says
'Negroes and poor people not wanted.'""
Unfortunately, the chain reaction does not stop here. "[T]he poor
[are forced] to remain in the big cities, and to continue to live predomi-
nately in unhealthy housing, located far from the better new jobs and good
public services." r5  Employables become unemployeds and finally unem-
ployable because there is no transportation link between the suburban job
site and the central city. Finally, there may be an explosion-an individual
rebelling against his environment, or perhaps the entire ghetto convulsing
in reaction to its frustration over the quality of life within its borders.
II. THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH.
One who challenges the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance has
no light burden and it is settled that before a zoning ordinance can
be declared unconstitutional it must be shown that its provisions are
clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to
the public health, safety, morals or general welfare. If the validity
of the legislative judgment is fairly debatable, the legislative judgment
must be allowed to control .... 5
With the problem in mind, it is time to examine the courts' traditional ap-
proach to the resolution of zoning cases which involve exclusionary zoning
techniques.
A. The Presumption of Constitutionality
As a legislative act, a zoning regulation is normally entitled to a "pre-
sumption of constitutionality."57 While it has been generally said that this
5 2 Williams and Wacks at 830. One commentator has further pointed out that
In 1968, 95 percent of the inhabitants of the suburban rings of metropolitan areas of
one million or more were white. The remaining 5 per cent of the suburbanites
who were black comprised only 19 per cent of all blacks living in metropolitan areas
of one million or more, while the 95 per cent of the surburbanites who were whites
comprised 62 per cent of all whites living in these metropolitan areas. The movement
of white families... is on the rise. In 1960, for example, only 55 per cent of the white
population in metropolitan areas of one million or more lived in the suburbs. If pres-
ent trends continue, the possibility of predominately black central cities surrounded by
predominately white suburbs is not unlikely. Brooks at 2.
5 3 See Coan, The Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968: Landmark Legislation for
the Urban Crisis, 1 URBAN LAWYER 1, 16-19 (1969).
54 DoUGLAs COMISSION at 1.
r0 Williams and Wacks at 839.
" Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 248-49, 263 A.2d 395, 400-01 (1970) (Jones, J., dissent-
ing).
57See Bilbar Construction Co. v. Board of Adjustment of Easttown Township, 393 Pa. 62,
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presumption is rebuttable,58 the burden which the opponent of a zoning
regulation must carry is quite formidable. To illustrate, it is generally said
that the plaintiff must prove by either dear and convincing evidence59 or be-
yond a reasonable doubt6" that the challenged zoning regulation bears no
substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or welfare, or if the
question presented is "fairly debatable"'" the zoning regulation must stand.
The reason for this heavy burden is quite dear. It rests squarely upon the
approach mandated by the United States Supreme Court some forty-five
years ago in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.6" where Mr. Justice Sutherland
stated:
If the validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly
debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to control. (emphasis
added) .P
and
[I]t must be said before the ordinance can be declared unconstitutional,
that such provisions are dearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no sub-
stantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare."
This approach has not been seriously altered by the Court since Euclid. In
fact, since Euclid, the Court has only decided one zoning case.6"
Accordingly, the lower courts have almost exclusively used the tradi-
tional approach and cast the heavy burden on the person attacking a zoning
ordinance. The opponent of an exclusionary zoning regulation, therefore,
has found himself in the same boat as the person attacking a regulation
which restricted the commercial or industrial use of property. For the most
part,68 the results have been very discouraging to persons seeking relief
from an exclusionary zoning regulation. When a zoning regulation prescrib-
ing a two acre minimum lot size in the Village of Sands Point, New York
was attacked, the New York Court of Appeals needed a scant two pages to
71, 141 A.2d 851, 856 (1958); Vickers v. Committee of Gloucester Township, 37 N.J. 232,
242, 181 A.2d 129, 134 (1962); 1 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 2.14 (1968).
58 1 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 2.14, at 69 (1968).
50 Id. § 2.17.
60 Id. § 2.18.
61 Simon v. Town of Needham, 311 Mass. 560, 564, 42 N.E.2d 516, 518 (1942); Vickers
v. Committee of Gloucester Township, 37 N.J. 232, 242, 181 A.2d 129, 134 (1962); Bilbar
Construction Co. v. Board of Adjustment of Easttown Township, 393 Pa. 62, 71, 141 A.2d 851,
856 (1958); 1 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 2.16 (1968).62 Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 356 (1926).
631d. at 388.
64 Id. at 395.
65 Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
6 6 Some cases have resulted in the zoning regulation, which might have had an exclusionary
effect, being struck down even when the traditional approach was ostensibly used. See, e.g.,
Aronson v. Town of Sharon, 346 Mass. 598, 195 N.E.2d 341 (1964); Lakeland Bluff, Inc. v.
County of Will, 114 Ill. App.2d 267; 252 N.E.2d 765 (1969).
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find the regulation valid.67 When the Supreme Court of New Jersey was
faced with a zoning regulation which totally prohibited mobile homes in a
township of 23 square miles, the regulation was upheld.6" Earlier, the New
Jersey Supreme Court even found a regulation requiring a minimum of five
acres valid, 9 and in an unrelated case upheld a regulation which prescribed
minimum floor areas of 768 feet for one story homes, 1000 feet for two
story homes without garages, and 1200 feet for two story homes with ga-
rages.7" On the west coast, the California Supreme Court upheld a zoning
ordinance which excluded multiple family dwellings from over 997o of a
town's area.7 ' And in Missouri, the Supreme Court of that state upheld a
zoning ordinance requiring a minimum of three acres on the outskirts of the
rapidly growing St. Louis area. 2 It probably cannot be said that the results
in these cases stemmed solely from the presumption of constitutionality,
since there were other factors present. However, it is submitted that with-
out the presumption of constitutionality, or if the presumption had favored
the person attacking the regulation, there is a strong possibility that many,
if not all, of these cases would have resulted in a different decision.
B. Zoning Laws Must Be in The General Welfare
Among the other factors considered by the courts in the above cases
were the economic harm to the property owner,73 the harmful effects of
overcrowding,74 and aesthetics.76 If these factors are subjected to close
examination in the context in which they arose, it is evident that they all
were confined to the community which enacted the zoning regulation. Thus,
the economic harm to the property owner meant the economic harm to the
individual whose property was subject to regulation, the harmful effects of
overcrowding meant overcrowding within the immediate area of the land
whose zoning was questioned and within the enacting community, and aes-
thetics meant the beauty of solely the enacting community. While there is
a strong body of precedent which would indicate that "general welfare" does
6 7 Levitt v. Village of Sands Point, 6 N.Y.2d 269, 160 N.E.2d 501, 189 N.Y.S.2d 212
(1959).68 Vickers v. Committee of Gloucester Township, 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962).
60 Fischer v. Township of Bedminster, 11 N.J. 194, 93 A.2d 378 (1952).
7 0 Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Township of Wayne, 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693 (1952), appeal
dirmissed 344 U.S. 919 (1953). This case has received considerable comment in the law reviews.
See Haar, Zoning for Minimua Standards: The Wayne Township Case, 66 HARV. L .REV. 1051
(1953); Haar, Wayne Township: Zoning for Who?-In Brief Reply, 67 HARV. L REV. 986
(1954); Williams and Wacks.
7 1 Hamer v. Town of Ross, 59 Cal.2d 776, 382 P.2d 375, 31 Cal. Rptr. 335 (1963).
7 2 Flora Realty & Investment Co. v. City of Ladue, 362 Mo. 1025, 246 S.W.2d 771 (1952),
appeal dismissed 344 U.S. 802 (1952).
7 3 See, e.g., id. at 1037,246 S.W.2d at 776-77.
74See, e.g., Simon v. Needham, 311 Mass. 560, 563, 42 N.E.2d 516, 518 (1942).
7 5 See, e.g., Vickers v. Committee of Gloucester Township, 37 N.J. 232, 247, 181 A.2d 129,
137 (1952).
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refer "solely to the needs of the area doing the zoning,"76 it is not clear that
"general welfare" should have such a restricted meaning. In fact, contrary
to the body of precedent which restricts the concept of "general welfare",
there is case law which would indicate that a community must consider fac-
tors beyond its municipal limits when enacting zoning regulations.77  Fur-
thermore, an examination of the decision in Euclid reveals that the parochial
interest of a community, as embodied in its zoning regulations, is subordinate
to the general welfare. As Mr. Justice Southerland stated:
[T~he village [of Euclid], though physically a suburb of Cleveland, is
politically a separate municipality, with powers of its own and authority
to govern itself as it sees fit within the limits of the organic law of its
creation and the State and Federal Constitutions .... It is not meant by
this, however, to exclude the possibility of cases where the general public
interest would so far outweigh the interest of the municipality that the
municipality would not be allowed to stand in the way, (emphasis
added) .78
Thus, it appears that while there is a sizable body of precedent which would
restrict the application of the concept of "general welfare" to the enacting
community, there is also precedent for not giving it such a restricted interpre-
tation. Moreover, the less restrictive interpretation would seem to be
grounded in the better reasoning. It is easy to imagine the results which
could follow if each community were left to its own devices without any re-
gard for its neighbors and other factors beyond its municipal limits. For
example, a hospital could be built on appropriately zoned land in Commun-
ity X, and Community Y would be free to zone adjoining land within its
municipal limits for heavy industrial use.
Where exclusionary zoning is involved, the concept of "general wel-
fare" becomes crucial. If "general welfare" is restricted "solely to the needs
of the area doing the zoning, ' 79 it should be clear that the interests of third
parties living outside the enacting community and neighboring communities
(extraterritorial factors) need not be considered. Accordingly, a community
would be able to enact zoning regulations which would exclude newcomers
who would not bring with them a sufficient tax base to be self supporting,
since the interests of the enacting community would be furthered by such
action. However, it has become increasingly dear that a community can-
not avoid the tide of the outward population expansion from our larger
cities. Rather, a community in the path of this tide must accept its share
7 6 Note, Constitutional Law-Equal Protection-Snob Zoning: Must a Man's Home Be a
Castle? 69 MicH. L. REv. 339, 355 (1970).
77Township of River Vale v. Town of Orangetown, 403 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1968), 83 HARV.
L. REV. 679 (1970); Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont, 15 N.J. 238, 104 A.2d 441(1954).
78 272 U.S. 365, 389-90.
79 See note 76 supra.
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of the burdens created by increased population, ° and a "zoning ordinance
whose primary purpose is to prevent the entrance of newcomers in order to
avoid future burdens, economic and otherwise, upon the administration of
public services and facilities can not be held valid." '  In short, where ex-
clusionary zoning is at issue a community cannot turn its back on extraterri-
torial factors.
C. Interests of Third Parties
If consideration is given to extraterritorial factors, it should follow that
the interests or rights of third parties living outside the enacting community
must be considered. Unfortunately, there has been little judicial discussion
of these interests. 82  This may in part stem from the fact that the zoning
cases which have reached the United States Supreme Court" dealt primarily
with commercial and industrial zoning, and as a result there was no reason
for the Court to consider these interests. But more probably, this absence
of judicial discussion stems from the fact that the parties who have sought
to overturn exclusionary zoning regulations were builders, developers, or
land speculators who were merely attempting to vindicate their own eco-
nomic interests, and who did not argue in support of the interests of third
parties. Accordingly, absence of judicial discussion should not be interpreted
as meaning these interests are unworthy of consideration. Instead, the
better reasoned analysis would indicate that these interests were not properly
before the courts. This, of course, raises the question as to what should be
the judicial reaction when these interests are properly raised. More point-
edly, should the presence of these interests have an impact on the tradi-
tional presumption of constitutionality?
III. A CONSIDERATION OF THE PRESUMPTION
OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
The power to zone is derived from the police powers of each state. As
indicated earlier, when this power is exercised and zoning legislation is
passed, the resulting zoning ordinance is normally entitled to a "presumption
of constitutionality." Notwithstanding the "presumption of constitution-
ality", a zoning ordinance will be struck down as unconstitutional if it does
not bear a substantial relationship to the public health, safety, morals, or
80 See Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, 439 Pa. 466, - , 268 A.2d 765, 768-69 (1970); Ap-
peal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 244-45, 263 A.2d 395, 398-99 (1970).
8 1 National Land and Investment Co. v. Easttown Township Board of Adjustment, 419 Pa.
504, 532, 215 A.2d 597, 612 (1965).
82 But see Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, 439 Pa. 466, - , 268 A.2d 765, 768 n. 6 (1970);
Vickers v. Committee of Gloucester Township, 37 N.J. 232, 265-66, 181 A.2d 129, 147 (1962)
(Hall J. dissenting).
8 3 Eudid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277
U.S. 183 (1928).
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general welfare. Therefore, "[iln practice, the question of validity turns on
the extent to which a. court will regard the legislative decision as determina-
tive of the public interest supporting the legislation and hence to what ex-
tent and for what purposes the court will itself examine the facts."4 Largely,
because of the decision in Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 5 where the Supreme
Court looked to the facts in declaring a zoning ordinance of the City of
Cambridge invalid, courts in most jurisdictions have been willing to examine
the facts in zoning cases. Accordingly, the presumption of constitutionality
is generally not conclusive. However, this reliance on Nectow may be mis-
placed because the United States Supreme Court's treatment of the presump-
tion of constitutionality where social and economic issues are involved has
changed radically since its decision in Nectow. At that time, the Court was
in transition from its position taken in Lochner v. New York"' and Coppage
v. Kansas,8 7 which was tantamount to a presumption of invalidity,8 to its
present position articulated in Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri" and
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.,"0 which is tantamount to a conclusive pre-
sumption of constitutionality. Accordingly, Nectow applied neither a pre-
sumption of invalidity nor a conclusive presumption of constitutionality.
Rather, there the Court used a rebuttable presumption of constitutionality.
It would appear that subsequent zoning cases would not necessarily apply
this standard9' but would instead utilize the most current test. For recent
cases, this would entail an application of a near conclusive presumption of
constitutionality.
It should be dear that the above analysis is very generalized. While a
majority of zoning cases may fall within its scope and therefore would be
subject to a near conclusive presumption of constitutionality, others do not
for various reasons. For example, it is clear that there would be no con-
clusive presumption of constitutionality or even a rebuttable presumption of
constitutionality where zoning regulations were expressly based on race.2
This raises the question whether this analysis and its resulting near conclusive
presumption of constitutionality should be applicable where exclusionary
zoning is at issue. If it is not, then should a presumption which can be re-
butted by clear and convincing evidence or a presumption of invalidity similar
84 Hetherington, State Economic Regulation and Substantive Due Process of Law, 53 Nw.
U. L. REV. 13 (1958) (hereinafter cited as Hetherington].
85277 U.S. 183 (1928); see 1 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 2.11 (1968).
8 6 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
8 7 Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
8 8 See Hetherington at 22.
89 Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952).
90 Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
9 1 Where zoning disputes are based on' state due process, the courts of each state would,
of course, be free to determine ther own test notwithstanding federal decisions which are inter-
pretative of due process.
9 2 See Buchanan v. Waley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917); Hetherington at 14-15; cf. Loving v.
Virginia 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
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to that which, in effect, the Supreme Court used in Lochner and Coppage be
applicable? It seems that the above questions can be answered by consider-
ing the reason for the apparent shift in the Supreme Court's judicial stance
in moving from Lochner to Williamson v. Lee Optical together with the
traditional reasons for the recognition of presumptions. The reason for the
Court's shift is not easily found; however, it has been stated that "[t]he near-
est thing to an explanation is perhaps to be found in Mr. Justice Frank-
furter's concurrence in American Federation of Labor v. American Sash &
Door Co., where he argued that 'the judiciary is prone to misconceive the
public good' and that matters of policy, depending as they do on impond-
erable value issues, are best left to the people and their representatives."93
This contention finds reinforcement in Williamson v. Lee Optical4 where
Mr. Justice Douglas speaking for the Court stated:
The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of business
and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out
of harmony with a particular school of thought. . . We emphasize
again what Chief Justice Waite said in Afann v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113,
134, "For protection against abuses by legislatures the people must resort
to the polls, not to the courts."95
Thus, while the following rationale may be subject to dispute, " it appears
that the reason for the Court's shift was predicated upon recognition that
matters over which the legislature exercises control should generally be cor-
rected by the voters at the polls and not by the courts.
The traditional reasons for the recognition of presumptions have been
concisely outlined by Professor McCormick. They are 1) probability, 2)
procedural convenience, 3) fairness in allocating the burden of producing
evidence upon the party who has superior means of access to the proof, and
4) notions, usually implicit rather than expressed, of social and economic
policy. 7
Considering first the reason for the Supreme Court's shift in thinking, it
is apparent that the reason cannot serve as a justification where exclusionary
zoning is at issue. This is clear since people excluded from a community
can not turn to the polls and remove the councilman of the community who
voted to enact the exclusionary zoning regulation. If these third parties are
to have a remedy, it must be a judicial one since their path to the polls would
be barred by residency requirements. Furthermore, if there is to be an ef-
fective judicial remedy, it is apparent that either a near conclusive presump-
93 McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An, Exhumatiom and Reburial,
1962 SUPREME COURT REVIEW 34,44 [hereinafter cited as McCloskey].
04 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
Or Id. at 488.
90 It could be contended that the Court's shift was a reaction to the threat of Court packing.
97 C. McCoa iucI, HANDBOOK OP THE LAW OF EVIDENcE § 309, at 641 (1954).
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tion or a presumption of constitutionality would be inappropriate, since in
both instances the ability of the courts to look at the facts would be severely
restricted. This has been recognized in the areas of free speech 8 and legisla-
tive apportionment 9 where any attempt to limit the process of self govern-
ment will be met with increased judicial supervision. °° Similarly, where
exclusionary zoning is at issue, there should also be increased judicial super-
vision.
A. The Presumption of Invalidity
Increased judicial supervision can best be achieved by recognizing a pre-
sumption of invalidity'0 1 when it is alleged0 2 that a zoning regulation is ex-
clusionary. It is believed there is a sound basis for this approach in terms
of the reasons previously articulated for the recognition of presumptions.'0 3
1. Probability
Considering probability, it is clear that the probability of a residential
zoning ordinance being exclusionary is great. This follows from the fact
that higher densities will generally yield lower costs per housing unit. As
a result, any residential zoning regulation which bars higher density housing
will most certainly be exclusionary'"° since people who can afford the higher
density housing and cannot afford the housing authorized by the zoning
regulation are precluded from living in the local area.
However, it must be recognized that density regulation is a proper func-
tion of the police power.10 5 It is only when density zoning is used primarily
to prevent the entrance of newcomers that it is invalid. Therefore, it is ap-
parent that the previous analysis begs the real question which must be an-
swered. This question is whether more exclusionary zoning regulations are
98 See McCloskey at 45-47.
99 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Neal, Baker v. Carr: Politics in Search of Law, 1962
SUPREME COURT REVIEW 252, 287.
100 Cf. McCloskey at 47.
101 The allegation that a residential zoning xegulation is exclusionary would give rise to a
presumption of invalidity. In order to sustain the zoning regulation, the local government would
have to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the zoning regulation bears a substantial
relationship to the public health, morals, and welfare. Note, Zoning, Closing the Economic
Gap, 43 TEMP. L. Q. 347, 355-56 (1970).
102 There are two logical points at which the burden could shift to the excluding commu-
nity-upon a showing that a zoning regulation has an exclusionary effect or upon an allegation
that a zoning regulation has an exclusionary effect The former choice, of course, presupposes
the adequacy of information necessary to show the exclusionary effect. However, it was the find-
ing of the Douglas Commission that:
ITihe factual information needed to show the significance of exclusionary practices
simply does not exist in most areas, and the cost to a private litigant of obtaining it
would prove prohibitive. DOUGLAS COMMISSION at 217.
103 See text accompanying note 97 supra.
104 See note 1 supra.
105 1 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 7.06, at 486 (1968).
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enacted primarily to prevent the entrance of newcomers or for reasons which
might be considered valid. Unfortunately no empirical information is avail-
able to answer this question. Furthermore, an analysis of the relevant
cases would be inaccurate since most of these cases were decided using the
traditional presumption of constitutionality. As a result, in spite of what
judicial notice might be taken of the findings of the Douglas and Kaiser
Commissions this reason should drop out because the degree of subjectivity
involved precludes any quantitative analysis. Therefore, the basis for the
presumption of invalidity must be found among the remaining three reasons.
2. Procedural Convenience
The imposition of a presumption of invalidity would not result in so
great a procedural inconvenience as to outweigh the other affirmative
reasons for recognizing this presumption. This is partially evident from
the fact that the presumption of invalidity would not apply to the entire
spectrum of zoning. Only that segment which regulates housing would
be touched. The broad and complex areas of zoning which deal with in-
dustrial and commercial uses would not be involved.
3. Fairness in Allocating the Burden
Closely related to procedural convenience is the fairness in allocating
the burden of producing evidence upon the party who has superior means
of access to the proof. It is abundantly clear that of the parties involved,
the community should have the superior means of access to the proof since
the information necessary to sustain the challenged zoning regulation
would, at least in theory, have been used in the formulation of the
community's comprehensive plan.'06 The comprehensive plan would, of
course, include the zoning regulation as an integral part. While in prac-
tice this might not be the case, the equities of the situation surely favor
placing the burden on the community who should have the requisite in-
formation available if it is doing an adequate and proper planning job.
As can be seen, a premium would be placed on good planning, a highly
desirable end in itself.
4. Consideration of Social or Economic Policy
Any consideration of social or economic policy should favor a pre-
sumption of invalidity since this would further our national housing policy
as articulated in the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968:
The Congress finds that the supply of the Nation's housing is not increas-
ing rapidly enough to meet the national housing goal, established in the
Housing Act of 1949, of the "realization as soon as feasible of the goal of
100 For a discussion of "comprehensive plan" see id. § 5.02.
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a decent home and a suitable living environment for every American fam-
ily." The Congress reaffirms this national housing goal and determines
that it can be substantially achieved within the next decade by the con-
struction or rehabilitation of twenty-six million housing units, six million
of these for low and moderate income families.10 7
The recognition of a presumption of invalidity would have the direct
effect of increasing the number of housing starts. Zoning regulations
which effectively barred the construction of low-and medium-cost housing
would lose their protective shield with the demise of the presumption of
constitutionality. Accordingly, absent an affirmative showing of the rea-
sonableness of the exclusionary regulation, construction of desperately
needed housing could begin in the suburbs where previously barred by
parochial interests.However, it might be contended that this recognition of a presumption
of invalidity would produce results directly in conflict with zoning and
planning's policy of comprehensive rationality. 08 Indeed, this approach
might produce some "incremental decision-making [which] is the antithe-
sis of zoning and planning's emphasis on comprehensive rationality."'10
But it must be remembeied that the presumption of invalidity would be
limited; it would only apply to that segment of the zoning spectrum which
regulates housing. Furthermore, if this produces bad decision making
which is to some extent the "antithesis of zoning and planning's empha-
sis on comprehensive rationality," it should be apparent that it is decision
making which furthers the national policy by increasing housing starts.
Moreover, if truly "comprehensive rationality" is present in the first in-
stance, the exclusionary zoning regulation would probably be upheld.
Incremental decision making by the bench would probably only exist where
there has been incremental decision making without a rational basis by
the legislatures and administrative bodies which control the local zoning
process.
An additional policy consideration might be the ability of the courts
to hear and intelligently decide zoning cases. At least one commenta-
tor"0 is highly skeptical of the courts' ability to hear and decide zoning
cases where the question of reasonableness is raised, and the courts them-
selves are apparently skeptical of their own abilities."' However, an
examination of zoning cases reveals that some courts have already under-
107 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (a) (Supp. V 1970); see 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (Supp. V 1970) for the con-
gressional declaration of national housing policy made in the Housing Act of 1949.
108 Washburn, Apartments in the Suburbs: lo re Appeal of Joseph Girsh, 74 DICK. L. REV.
634, 651 (1970).
1o9 Id.
110 See id.
"'I See National Land and Investment Co. v. Easttown Township Board of Adjustment, 419
Pa. 504, 521, 215 A.2d 597, 606-07 (1965).
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taken a highly sophisticated factual analysis." 2 Upon dose consideration,
it would appear unlikely that much greater sophistication would be re-
quired to resolve zoning disputes arising under a presumption of invalidity.
Furthermore, it would seem that a court which could determine whether
a movie or book was "immoral" or determine reapportionment would be
able to decide whether the requisite reasonableness was proved by a com-
munity whose zoning regulation was alleged to be exclusionary." 3
In summation, the normal recourse for redress of legislative abuse is
the polls. However, where redress is not possible, the courts should
exercise increased judicial supervision of the legislative enactment which
creates an alleged abuse. As has been shown, when exclusionary zoning
is in issue, the means of political redress are not available to the aggrieved
third parties, and there is reason and need for increased judicial supervi-
sion. The best way to achieve this is by recognizing a presumption of
invalidity. Such recognition would be grounded in the traditional reasons
for the recognition of presumptions. Furthermore, such recognition would
not be without judicial precedent. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ap-
parently recognized this presumption in deciding Appeal of Kit-Mar
Builders, Inc.." 4
B. Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc.
Kit-Mar involved an attack upon a zoning regulation which prescribed
a two acre minimum lot size along existing roads and three acres in the
interior. The dispute came before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court after
the court of common pleas had reversed the Board of Adjustment by
holding the zoning ordinance invalid."" In affirming the lower court's
decision, the majority of the court totally disregarded the traditional
presumption of constitutionality. Instead, the court emphasized that:
"Absent some extraordinary justification, a zoning ordinance with mini-
mum lot sizes such as those in this case is completely unreasonable.""' 6
This apparent and radical departure caused one dissenting justice to re-
mark:
In all previous zoning cases, the Court has put the burden of proof on the
challenger of the legislation involved. By the present decision the Court
appears to reverse the burden, and says that "Absent some extraordinary
justification, a zoning ordinance with minimum lot sizes such as those in
this case is completely unreasonable" (emphasis added),1
112 See, e.g., Lakeland Bluff, Inc. v. County of Will, 114 Ill. App. 2d 267, 252 N.E.2d 765
(1969); National Land and Investment Co. v. Easttown Township Board of Adjustment, 419 Pa.
504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
113 Cf. McCloskey at 52-53.
"4 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970).
'15 Id. at -, 268 A.2d at 766.
116Id. at-, 268 A.2d at 767.
17 Id. at-, 268 A.2d at 779 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting).
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Indeed, the dissenting justice appears to be correct. The reason for this
shift of the burden is made appropriately clear throughout the opinion
and finds support in the previously decided case of Appeal of Girsh."8
The common theme of Kit-May and Girsh is that as "people are at-
tempting to move away from the urban core areas, relieving the grossly
over-crowded conditions that exist in most of our major cities,"119 the local
communities "must deal with the problems of population growth,"'20 cre-
ated by this migration. "They may not refuse to confront the future by
adopting zoning regulations that effectively restrict the population to near
present levels. '" 21 This theme had been articulated by the same court in
its earlier decision of National Land and Investment Co. v. Easttown
Township Board of Adjustment2 where the court had applied the tradi-
tional presumption of constitutionality. Why then did the Court in
Kit-Mar abruptly shift the presumption? Apparently, the reason for the
Court's action was its recognition of the "rights of other people [those
living outside the excluding community] desirous of moving into the area
in search of a comfortable place to live."'2 3  Although the Court in
Kit-Mar apparently reached its decision to reverse the burden on equal
protection grounds, 2 ' Kit-Mar is still important to the analysis attempted
earlier because of its express recognition of the rights of third parties
which is essential to any finding of a need for increased judicial supervi-
sion.
IV. THE COMMUNITY AND THE PRESUMPTION
OF INVALIDITY
If an allegation that a residential zoning regulation is exclusionary
gives rise to a presumption of invalidity, the resulting burden placed upon
the enacting community should not be impossible to discharge. In fact,
if a community does an adequate planning job and considers and gives
effect to regional as well as local needs, it should be able to rebut the
presumption of invalidity. The following discussion will briefly consider
this problem of rebuttal and based on Girsh attempt to outline tests for
deciding whether a community has met its burden by establishing a reason-
able basis for its zoning regulations.
118 Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237,263 A.2d 395 (1970).
119 Id. at 244, 263 A.2d at 398.
120 439 Pa. 466, -, 268 A.2d 765, 678 (1970); see Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 244-
45, 263 A.2d 395, 300 (1970).
121439 Pa. 466, -, 268 A.2d 765, 768 (1970); see Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 244-
45, 263 A.2d 395, 399 (1970).
122National Land and Investment Co. v. Easttown Township Board of Adjustment, 419
Pa. 504, 532, 215 A.2d 597, 612 (1965).
123 439 Pa. 466, n. 6, 268 A.2d 765, 768 n. 6 (1970); see Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237,
-, 263 A.2d 395, 398 (1970).
124439 Pa. 466, 244, n. 2, 268 A.2d 765, 768 (1970).
[Vol. 32
NOTES
In Girsh, the message is dear that a community must accept "its right-
ful part of the burden"'u2  created by the population expansion outward
from major cities. Implicitly, then, a community need not accept more
than "its rightful part of the burden." Thus, the Pennsylvania court has,
in effect, issued an ultimatum to the communities within its jurisdiction
to consider regional planning and to accept their share of the regional
burdens if they want to see their residential zoning regulations upheld.
As a result, several tests are discernable. First, absent any consideration
of the regional needs, the presumption of invalidity is not rebutted. Sec-
ond, if a community has given consideration to regional planning but has
not accepted "its rightful part of the burden," the presumption of inval-
idity is not normally rebutted. Third, if a community has given considera-
tion to regional planning and has accepted "its rightful part of the
burden," the presumption of invalidity is rebutted.
The second test would appear subject to the exception that a com-
munity which has considered regional planning and has not accepted "its
rightful part of the burden," may nevertheless rebut the presumption of
invalidity upon a showing of extraordinary justification for its regula-
tion.' It is difficult to visualize what would be extraordinary justifica-
tion. Probably, the presence of soil conditions that would not support
high rise apartments or other high density dwellings would qualify as an
extraordinary justification. Similarly, certain soil conditions might justify
a larger lot size in order to ensure the adequacy of on-site sewerage. How-
ever, in both cases it is emphasized that the burden would be upon the
enacting community to prove the extraordinary justification. Absent
adequate proof, the regulation would be invalid. Finally, it is noted that
aesthetics alone would probably not be "sufficient justification for an ex-
clusionary zoning technique. '1 27
V. CONCLUSION
As has been seen, there is a serious need in this country for more
adequate housing, especially for low-and middle-income families. The
servicing of this need is severely hampered by exclusionary zoning regu-
lations which drive up the cost of each housing unit, and force the poor
to remain in the ghettos separated by an economic barrier between them
and the jobs and amenities of the suburbs.
The traditional approach to zoning, which may be appropriate when
the recognized interests are those of the property owner and the com-
munity, is no longer adequate when the interests of people living outside
the community are drawn into focus. Because of these third parties and
12,437 Pa. 237, 245, 263 A.2d 395, 399 (1970).
126 See text accompanying note 116 supra.
127 Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 244, 263 A.2d 395, 398 (1970).
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their inability to seek political redress, it is apparent that there is a need
for increased judicial supervision. The best way to achieve this supervi-
sion is by recognizing a presumption of invalidity. Such recognition
would find a solid basis in the traditional reasons for the recognition of
presumptions. Furthermore, the presumption would not place an inordi-
nate burden on any community, for a community which considered and
gave effect to regional as well as local needs in drawing up its compre-
hensive plan and enacting its zoning regulations would probably be able
to rebut the presumption of invalidity.
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